1,2 measured an unsatisfactory high Built-In-Test (BIT) false alarm rate of 92% (threshold < 25%) during its first Operational Test And Evaluation Phase (OPEVAL) in 2000. On a good note, the V-22 did exceed its operational objectives for BIT fault detection and fault isolation rates. Afterwards, the Blue Ribbon Panel report identified the need to fix false alarms: "Expedite the plan to reduce the V-22 false-alarm rate in both the aircraft and ground systems, with priority on aircraft software." Correction of false alarms then became a high priority issue on the program. Therefore, a success-oriented engineering approach was developed and implemented to mature the diagnostics system in order to meet the operational requirements.
INTRODUCTION
False alarm indications are generally a function of software design while BIT fault detection and isolation performance are a function of both hardware and software design. Improving false alarm performance becomes a monumental challenge due primarily to fielding immature systems and the inability to quickly update the design after fielding. To correct false alarms, design changes are required at the subsystem level or in the mission computer's Operational Flight Program (OFP). Mechanization of the BIT design must be well documented; otherwise false alarms cannot be easily fixed. Furthermore, various diagnostics information needs to be categorized and presented to the aircrew and maintainers in a manner that supports the maintenance concept of the aircraft and the business model for maintenance operations, reference [1] . Only diagnostic indications that enunciate a failure adversely affecting mission capability, that convey a need for preventative maintenance, or that communicate an overstress condition should be displayed. Engineering information should not be reported to the operators. The following paragraphs describe the tasks that were accomplished and products that were produced on the V-22 Osprey to improve false alarm performance.
BIT MATURATION PLAN
A team of diagnostics professionals from the Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and industry team worked together to develop a plan to mature BIT. It was strongly influenced by the lessons learned from the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and the reconnaissance F/A-18D(RC) programs. The team developed a blueprint to work all BIT issues related to design, test, data collection and scoring, performance calculations, anomaly documentation, and performing root cause analysis and developing corrective action plans. The following subparagraphs summarize the primary issues in this plan.
BIT Design Process
Process changes were implemented so that new equipment would have a thorough BIT analysis conducted to ensure the design is well defined. This analysis would quantify the fault detection and fault isolation performance and thoroughly describe the BIT mechanization within the equipment and how it would be presented to the operators. Detailed engineering information is required to support root cause analysis and the development of corrective action plans for false alarms.
Quantitative BIT Analysis
This analysis quantifies the inherent design for fault detection and fault isolation performance. Fault isolation was to a single Weapons Replaceable Assembly (WRA). Only component failures would be considered for analysis. The failure rate was determined using the procedure outlined in the "Stress Analysis and Reliability Predictions". The fault detection and fault isolation performance was identified for each fault code so if a test is deleted then its affect on detection and isolation will be known.
BIT Description Document
This analysis thoroughly describes each BIT test, provides an overview of the hardware and operational functions, characterizes each mode of operation, and shows the BIT reporting mechanization from the subsystems and how it is passed through the software and finally presented to the operators on the cockpit displays and ground station. The criticality of each code was to be identified for the failure mode it detects. Defining the BIT thresholds and filtering for each code is critical to the false alarm maturation process. Ability to adjust these thresholds and filtering either in hardware, software, or firmware were also needed to be defined in order to fine-tune these tolerances to best match the V-22's operating environment. Verticality testing between organizational, intermediate, and depot-level maintenance would be identified to ensure the thresholds are properly set to minimize false alarms on the aircraft but accurately detect failures using automatic test equipment. Each fault code would be assessed to determine whether it is applicable for supporting the aircraft's operational and maintenance environments or whether it is more applicable for engineering information.
Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
The FMECA will identify all failure modes. Where BIT is identified as the method of detecting a failure mode, the fault code(s) will be listed. The effects of each failure mode will be described and which BIT test will detect the failure mode, and whether the indicated BIT test can fault isolate the failure to the Shop Replaceable Assembly (SRA) or WRA. The FMECA will classify each fault code as detecting and isolating a mission critical or non-mission critical failure. This process ensures no unnecessary BIT tests will be created and that the failure modes of the hardware are checked by a defined BIT test.
BIT Test and Evaluation
Testing was accomplished to verify the BIT requirements in the V-22's Joint Operational Requirements Document (JORD) and aircraft's detail specification. BIT detection and fault isolation performance is first evaluated in the laboratory to ensure the equipment meets its individual specification. During reliability testing, fault detection and fault isolation can again be assessed along with false alarm performance. During development and operational flight tests, all BIT performance parameters are evaluated concurrent with naturally occurring failures.
Subsystem BIT Assessment Test
The purpose of the BIT assessment test is to determine the fault detection and fault isolation performance of the equipment in a laboratory environment. It consists of inserting simulated failures, one at a time, into the equipment. Where possible, the failures to be simulated and the method of simulation will be non-destructive. The quantity of simulated failures will be based on the equipment's predicted Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF). Faults will be distributed in a manner that is inversely proportional to the SRAs' MTBF. Corrective actions will be implemented and verified effective through retest.
System Level Release Test
As part of the mission computer's OFP system level release testing, all diagnostic indications (e.g., WRA, warning, caution, advisory, consumables, and exceedance indications) will be evaluated to ensure the appropriate cue is shown on the cockpit displays. Running initiated BIT or maintenance BIT on subsystems will also be accomplished.
Development Flight Test
The majority of flight tests were conducted at the Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland, and Edwards Air Force Base, California. Members from the diagnostics team attended pilot debrief of flights and collected the BIT and reliability data from ground and flight tests. These data were analyzed and scored using the agreed upon BIT evaluation criteria. Deficiencies were documented in the V-22 Problem Report database for prioritization and corrective action. Aircraft multiplex data was also recorded to assist with root cause analysis and development of corrective action plans.
Operations at VMX-22
Newly manufactured Block A aircraft were delivered to Marine Tilt Rotor Test and Evaluation Squadron 22 (VMX-22) at Marine Corps Air Station New River, North Carolina. BIT performance on these aircraft was closely tracked to identify any new trends induced by the Block A production configuration. Furthermore, these aircraft were flown during OPEVAL II. Monitoring their performance before OPEVAL II reduced the risk of failing the false alarm requirement. 
CHANGING FALSE ALARM METRICS
Currently, the metric being used to measure BIT false alarms on the V-22 is Mean Flight Hour Between False Alarm (MFHBFA). The previous (obsolete) metric was false alarm rate, which was useful for determining the percentage of BIT indications that are false; however, it did not quantify the frequency of false BIT indications. Also, there is an inherent deficiency associated with the false alarm percentage metric, in that high reliability equipment is penalized. For instance, if System A has 5 false BIT indications and no failures in 500 flight-hours, the false alarm rate is 100 percent. If System B has 5 false BIT indications and 5 BIT relevant failures in 500 flight hours then its false alarm rate is 50 percent. From the false alarm percentage metric, System B appears to have fewer false alarms than System A. However, both systems had one false BIT indication for every 100 flight-hours. The MFHBFA metric will quantify false alarms so that system reliability does not skew the results, reference [2] . During development testing, management can better track corrective actions for false alarms using MFHBFA instead of false alarm rate.
BIT EVALUATION CRITERIA
Working together, the diagnostics team drafted BIT evaluation criteria to ensure development test agencies calculate BIT performance in the same manner as operational test activities. Overall, BIT metrics and their definitions have been well defined in the diagnostics community; however, the criterion to determine what BIT indications should go into the numerator and denominator of these equations was not well established. In addition, the maintenance concept of the aircraft and how the BIT indications are mechanized to support this concept needed to be integrated into the BIT evaluation criteria. The BIT reporting scheme and its human-machine interface design also had to be considered when scoring BIT indications. A generic set of these evaluation criteria can be found in reference [3] .
BIT Definitions
Definitions were established to characterize the BIT parameters so that performance values would accurately depict how well BIT compares to its operational and specification requirements for troubleshooting and repairing the aircraft. Along with each definition, equations were also provided to calculate performance. An important note to highlight is that BIT can only detect failures on equipment that have diagnostic capability. Not every failure mode on an aircraft is BIT detectable; e.g., stripped bolts, torn weather seals, minor fluid leaks, chipped paint, etc.
Software anomalies are also not included in BIT performance calculations since maintenance personnel cannot repair them; engineering changes have to be implemented to correct software problems.
Scoring Methodology
Comprehensive guidelines for scoring BIT indications based upon the aircraft's maintenance concept were established by the team. What constitutes relevant and non-relevant indications were defined for each BIT metric. For example, codes set when equipment is turned off or is not installed would be non-relevant. Furthermore, the definition of a false alarm was thoroughly discussed so everyone on the team fully understood its meaning thereby alleviating irrational interpretations and minimizing conflicts. It was also important to show a logic tree for scoring indications using fault detect and isolate codes, reference [3] .
Deficiency Reporting
BIT deficiencies were documented into the V-22 Problem Reporting system. The following subparagraphs provide examples of BIT deficiencies:
a. Inability of BIT to detect or isolate a failure to a single WRA. b. False alarm indications. c. BIT identifying a subsystem failed and then resetting itself as pass throughout the mission when the equipment is not installed.
Improvement Guidelines
Once a corrective action was verified effective, the false alarm was removed from the calculations. Satisfactory corrective action plans for improving false alarm performance are listed in the following subparagraphs (preferably in the following order):
a. Correct the software or firmware to eliminate the design deficiency that caused the false alarm indication. b. Implement a more effective filtering algorithm in the software or firmware such as an M-of-N counter, time delay, etc. c. Implement an algorithm in the operational flight program that will mask a code under specified conditions; e.g., masked only during weight-offwheels, or when the engine speed is below a certain percent. d. Delete the BIT test at the subsystem level while considering safety and supportability issues; however this will reduce the BIT percent fault detection performance of the system.
PLANNING FOR BIT FIXES
Since false alarms are generally a function of software design, multiple software versions for the various subsystems and mission computer OFP were needed. Several hardware changes were also implemented. Figure 1 shows the numerous configuration changes in the graph's abscissa that were developed on the V-22 to improve the MFHBFA metric. Incremental engineering software versions underwent flight tests to ensure they fixed the false alarms before they were bundled together into the fleet release before OPEVAL II. The software team fully supported the program's commitment to fixing BIT by making false alarms a high priority in each software build.
Software Upgrades

Hardware Changes
Numerous hardware changes were also implemented on the Block A aircraft to fix false alarms. Their contribution to improving MFHBFA are identified as Block A and A/C 50-57 in figure 1.
EVALUATE BIT PERFORMANCE
BIT performance was evaluated on all the various aircraft configurations during development flight tests and on the Block A configuration at VMX-22. Figure 1 shows how the MFBFA improved from 0.2 hours to 1.6 hours from the fixes implemented in the various software and hardware configurations.
Development Flight Tests
A test plan was written identifying the process for collecting and scoring BIT data, calculating performance values, and reporting results, reference [4] . A database was developed using Microsoft Excel to store BIT data from the ground station, score it, and calculate performance values. Utilizing a common program to share BIT data with design engineers to assist with root cause analysis was a lessons learned from the F/A-18D(RC), reference [5] . BIT performance values were frequently reported to management. Plus, the status of each false alarm was presented in a Pareto chart using color-coding and was jokingly referred to as the Christmas tree chart, figure 2. Color-coding was used to highlight which codes had a corrective action, which ones were still in-analysis, and which ones were not being worked.
VMX-22 Operations
The same process was used to evaluate BIT performance during VMX-22 operations. After the OPEVAL II software version A201 (with numerous false alarm fixes incorporated) was released, the false alarm performance calculations were re-started.
This re-start provided the most accurate and fair way to determine false alarm improvement.
Aircraft Maintenance Event Ground Station (AMEGS)
AMEGS was used during the diagnostics evaluation to collect BIT data and to generate work orders through Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management Information System Optimized Organization Maintenance Activity (NALCOMIS-OOMA). Many lessons learned were discovered while using AMEGS, which can be found in reference [1] . Furthermore, an engineering version of AMEGS was developed so engineers at the factory could view the aircraft downloads, which was instrumental with performing root cause analysis on false alarms.
PERFORM ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
Root cause analysis is an essential task to mature false alarm performance. Effectiveness of corrective actions is highly dependent upon how well engineers analyze false alarms and how well they understand the equipment's BIT mechanization into the weapon system. Therefore, a success-oriented engineering approach was implemented to analyze false alarms and understand the reasons they occur. Reference [6] identifies a seven-step process to perform root cause analysis on false alarms during the design and development phase in order to implement effective corrective actions prior to fleet delivery. These seven steps are listed below:
Step 1: Collect and analyze BIT indications.
Step 2: Attempt to duplicate indications.
Step 3: Verify equipment configuration.
Step 4: Analyze BIT design.
Step 5: Analyze software design -requirements and actual coding.
Step 6: Analyze aircraft multiplex data.
Step 7: Return equipment to vendor for analysis.
Industry team implemented their Corrective Action Plan (CAP) process and held weekly meetings tracking their progress. Actions to fix the false alarms were documented in each CAP along with due dates. Progress reports were discussed at the weekly meetings on these due dates. Aggressively working root cause analysis and corrective action plans by the Integrated Product Team (IPT) leads was one of the key factors that made V-22 successful in fixing BIT.
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VERIFICATION OF FIXES
False alarm fixes in both hardware and software changes were evaluated during development flight tests to ensure they worked. Engineering software versions were tested on the aircraft as an early check. Sometimes these fixes were not 100% effective and threshold and filtering changes were made based upon the results of testing. This early testing made a huge improvement in the effectiveness of false alarm fixes. Figure 1 shows the expected MFHBFA growth up to 1.74 hours from the fixes; however, the final measured result was 1.6 hours which was a very close prediction. Results from this verification process were used to determine a fix effectiveness factor and applied to the MFHBFA projection model.
PROJECTING MFHBFA GROWTH
Projecting false alarm improvement was an essential task to determine if the BIT maturation program would succeed in meeting the false alarm requirement for OPEVAL II. The expected MFHBFA growth had to be determined and closely tracked based upon corrective actions being implemented in software and hardware upgrades. Figure 1 shows the projected MFHBFA at 1.57 hours at OPEVAL II, which rounded up to the 1.6 hours that was actually measured during OPEVAL II. Every six months, projecting MFHBFA growth should be performed to ascertain the impact of new false alarms.
Projection Guidelines
A list of the false alarms and their frequency were generated after each BIT review board. Corrective actions for each false alarm were identified beside the code. A reasonable fix effectiveness factor was determined for each false alarm using sound engineering judgment and the criteria in appendix A. Effectiveness values can be modified either higher or lower based upon justification from the IPT. If a false alarm remained in root cause analysis status for an excess amount of time and the corrective action could not reasonably be expected before OPEVAL II, then its fix effectiveness value was zero. These projections can also be applied to corrective actions that will occur post OPEVAL; however, the key aspect of this model is to project MFHBFA at OPEVAL. The entire process for projecting MFHBFA improvement is provided in appendix A. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
